Distributing the Wealth from the Earth by Arellano Yanguas, Javier & Mejía Acosta, Andrés
1 Introduction
The recent price and investment boom in the
mining and hydrocarbon sectors has triggered
widespread expectations for greater economic
and social development, especially among
developing countries. The potential success of a
development strategy based on the extraction of
non-renewable resources is largely dependent on
the share of revenue captured by the state from
the extractive sector, and the methods that
governments adopt to use and distribute that
revenue (Bebbington 2012). This article
acknowledges existing dilemmas around the
extraction of revenue – through taxes and
royalties – but focuses on the criteria used to
allocate revenue from extractive industries (EI)
to different levels of government.
The choice of a mechanism to allocate EI revenue
is an inherently political process. The exploitation
of natural resources has some specific features
that tend to differentiate the criteria used to
distribute this revenue from the general
decentralising framework in each country. In the
first place, minerals, oil and gas are frequently
concentrated in specific territories; the people
living there are likely to demand a share of the
proceeds from the extraction to compensate for
the use of their resources and the negative
externalities associated with extraction. Secondly,
minerals and hydrocarbons are non-renewable,
which puts additional pressure on replacing the
extracted resources with some investment in
durable assets, giving tangible (e.g. physical
infrastructure) or intangible (e.g. education)
benefits. These features have led to greater
decentralisation of EI-related revenue in recent
years, but the methods and mechanisms adopted
vary widely across countries. We find that
distributive mechanisms do not necessarily follow
existing lines of administrative or fiscal
decentralisation but rather, are renegotiated
across existing political motivations and
organisational capacity of the main stakeholders.
This article explores three questions:
z How do central governments share (or
distribute) the revenue from extractive
industries with different levels of sub-national
government (vertical distribution)?
z How do governments distribute EI revenue
across similar jurisdictions, some of which are
extractive but others not (horizontal
distribution)?
z To which extent do factors such as the
structure of the state and other conventional
political features determine the degree of
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decentralisation of EI revenues and the
modality of distribution?
In this article we contend that variations in the
horizontal and vertical distribution of revenues
does not only depend on technical considerations
for optimal distribution but also on the political
motivations and coalitions to distribute EI
revenues. We highlight the relative importance
of the timing of reforms to the EI sector, the
importance of federal versus unitary states, and
the relative bargaining power and alignment of
sub-national actors vis-à-vis the central
government. We discuss some preliminary
explanations and draw some policy implications.
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews
the main features of existing methods, rules and
practices for allocating resource revenues at sub-
national level. Section 3 shows the variation in
ten countries worldwide for which we have
identified reliable and comparable data on the
distribution of revenue. Finally, Section 4
discusses some of the salient political factors
that influence the adoption of different revenue
allocation policies. It also summarises the key
arguments and identifies knowledge gaps to
better understand the linkage between allocation
formulas and development outcomes at the local
level.
2 Methods for the distribution of resource revenue
This section gives an overview of common criteria
used to distribute EI-related revenue from
central to sub-national governments (vertical
distribution), as well as commonly used methods
to determine the distribution across sub-national
governments (horizontal distribution).
2.1 Vertical distribution of EI revenues
The key policy challenge for an effective vertical
distribution of revenues is to balance the need to
minimise fiscal volatility and financial liabilities
while appeasing increased social demands
coming from sub-national governments. In short,
EI revenues ignite the fiscal tensions between
central, regional and local governments. Three
criteria are commonly taken into consideration
when deciding the distribution of EI revenues
(Ahmad and Singh 2003): (a) matching
(administrative) responsibilities to the level of
fiscal transfers; (b) ensuring a political
equilibrium between the centre and the
periphery; and (c) managing volatile revenues.
a Matching responsibilities
According to this criterion, the share of transfers
(including EI-related transfers, all other fiscal
transfers and locally raised taxes) should match
the revenue needed by sub-national governments
to fund the public services they are responsible
for (Schoeder and Smoke 2002). In practice,
evaluating the ‘appropriate’ level of public
services as well as the ‘matching revenue’ needed
to fund them are difficult to assess and forecast;
extractive territories may claim a greater
entitlement to benefiting from EI-related
revenues but the actual allocations are subject to
political interpretation and intense bargaining.
b Political equilibrium between centre and periphery
In the context of good governance reforms
favouring decentralisation, the presence of the
extractive sector has encouraged demands from
sub-national governments to manage part of the
proceeds from EI. Frequently this has been
formulated as a ‘right’ that has been enshrined
in the constitutions of the countries (Ahmad and
Mottu 2003; Ross 2007). The literature suggests
that pre-existing levels of fiscal and political
decentralisation would further strengthen the
role of opposition parties and sub-national actors
to demand greater decentralisation reforms, but
conversely, when central governments have
contained or delayed pressures for fiscal or
political decentralisation, the overall level of
decentralisation tends to remain weak (Falleti
2010).
c Managing volatile revenues
Given the unpredictable nature of commodity
prices, revenue from extractive industries has the
potential to induce fiscal volatility in national and
sub-national public finances (Ahmad and Singh
2003). To minimise the impact of revenue volatility,
some have advocated a centralised management
of EI revenue through a savings or stabilisation
fund (Ahmad and Mottu 2003). This is done
partly to accumulate savings at the central level,
but also to protect sub-national entities from the
problems arising from handling revenue windfalls.
If fiscal centralisation is not technically feasible or
politically desirable, it is recommended to devolve
more ‘stable’ revenue that is independent from
international prices – such as royalties (when these
are calculated based on gross production), licences
and other fees. Finally, if volatile tax revenue is to
be decentralised, mechanisms should be introduced
to stabilise the flow of resources (Davis et al. 2003).
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Each of these criteria reveal the unavoidable
political nature of distributive debates and its
consequences. The actual allocations show the
tensions between objectively defined needs and
local perceptions, between the national perspective
and the demands of producing regions, between
the moderation of technical proposals and the
urge from radical decentralisation that frequently
accompany the discovery of mineral riches,
between ideal political designs and the influence
of pre-existing decentralisation arrangements.
Section 2.2 discusses additional allocation
criteria for distributing rents across producing
and non-producing districts.
2.2 Horizontal distribution of revenue from EI
A key discussion around the allocation of EI
revenue across different sub-national jurisdictions
focuses on whether to redistribute revenue solely
to territories that host extractive activities, and
whether the central government should reallocate
revenue through discretionary or institutionalised
rules, such as the adoption of a proportionality
formula. The existing literature has identified
three types of mechanisms: (a) direct allocation
from the central government, (b) formula-based
participation, and (c) devolution. In practice,
countries combine two or more criteria when
adopting redistribution formulas.
a Allocation from the central government
In this scenario, central governments seek to
centralise the macroeconomic management of
revenue to minimise the risk of uncontrolled
sub-national expenditure. Government finance is
usually transferred on an annual basis for specific
projects and development or regional investment
funds. Governments could also distribute
available revenue through competitive investment
grants aimed at supporting specific types of
projects. In principle, the adoption of competitive
grant mechanisms by the central government has
the potential to reinforce pre-existing economic
inequalities and power asymmetries between
sub-national governments. Some territories with
solid public finances may have greater expenditure
capabilities or possess the technical ability to
formulate and obtain additional resources
through competitive grant schemes. In any case,
these mechanisms of competitive allocation offer
more transparent alternatives than allocating
valuable resources through protracted or
clandestine political negotiations which may
intensify existing political divides.
b Formula-based participation
Through this mechanism, sub-national
governments receive a pre-determined share of
the revenue raised nationally. A formula set by
law determines both the amount to be allocated
and the obligation of the central government to
transfer those resources to both producing and
non-producing territories. The different needs
and characteristics of each jurisdiction can be
factored into the formula to compensate for pre-
existing inequalities, the size of the population
and, in some cases, the tax gap. The allocation
formula can also reflect different variables on
government performance, such as the fiscal
effort of each territorial unit.
While formulas can become more complex to
reflect different dynamics, the ultimate
challenge for policymakers is to ensure fairness
and efficiency. Excessive complexity can trigger
conflicts regarding interpretation of the formula,
counteracting any marginal gain in terms of
equity and efficiency. However, formula-based
participation, even if well designed, can also have
some drawbacks. It reduces the flexibility of the
central government to manage the
macroeconomic challenges associated with EIs,
and does not take into consideration the
geographical source of tax revenue.
c Devolution
Devolution involves the transfer of revenue, or a
proportion of it, to the jurisdiction where the
income has been generated.1 In the case of
revenue from EI, devolution makes the
producing regions, and sometimes those that
host some infrastructure for exploitation (mainly
ports), the only recipients of transfers. This
mechanism aims to compensate producing
regions for negative externalities linked to
extraction, and the need to adjust infrastructure
and public services to the presence of mining and
oil operations (Brosio 2003). However, the
concentration of transfers to producing regions
might generate three types of problems:
(a) inequality between producing and non-
producing regions; (b) problems of revenue
volatility in producing regions; and (c) to
discourage collection of local taxes and distort
the allocation of resources at the local level
because of the abundance of transfers.
The implementation of devolution mechanisms
requires identification of the jurisdictions that
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should be prioritised. The following two criteria
are the most frequently used: (a) the geographical
origin of the revenue, and (b) territories affected
by negative externalities linked to extraction.2
The criterion of origin tries to compensate for the
loss of natural capital (the mineral) by financial
transfers to the governments of the territories
where the extraction takes place. Such transfers
should in principle help to develop other types of
capital (human, physical, etc.) to enhance the
developmental potential of those territories.
Frequently, the strict application of this criterion
leaves out neighbouring jurisdictions that are also
affected by extraction. The criterion of negative
externalities tries to solve this limitation. It takes
into account environmental damage, but also the
need to improve physical infrastructure (roads,
the electrical grid, etc.) and to scale up public
services in order to respond to the likely increase
in population due to immigration from other
regions of the country.
This section discussed the extent to which
political or technical criteria largely informs the
distribution of EI revenues. The next section
looks at comparative data from a set of ten
resource-rich countries to determine, for
example, whether countries with greater fiscal
and administrative decentralisation are in fact
more likely to distribute a larger share of EI
revenues to sub-national governments than
formal unitary countries.
3 Sub-national transfers in comparative
perspective
A brief review of the comparative evidence
available (see Table 1 in Annex) shows that
existing methods for distributing EI revenues
between central and sub-national governments
(vertical distribution), and across producing and
non-producing regions (horizontal distribution)
vary widely. The data, collected for ten resource-
rich countries (oil and mining) where reliable
and comparable information was located
(Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Ghana,
Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea
and Peru) shows that allocations do not reflect
the ‘pure types’ identified in the literature.
Table 1 summarises the distribution of EI
revenues between central, regional, state and
local government levels according to the last
reform in each country.3 This section highlights
some patterns and regularities found in the
distribution.
3.1 Vertical distribution
Table 1 reports countries according to their
degree of decentralisation of EI revenues.
Decentralisation is (a) low if all sub-national
governments receive less than 10 per cent of
state EI revenue (Ecuador, Ghana and Papua
New Guinea); (b) medium if sub-national
governments receive between 10 per cent and
50 per cent of the EI revenue (Colombia,
Indonesia and Mexico); and (c) high if sub-
national governments receive more than 50 per
cent of the EI revenue accrued to the central
government (Bolivia, Brazil, Peru and Nigeria).
The table also provides information on the share
of total EI revenue that is formally allocated to
each tier of government.
The first striking feature is that decentralisation
of EI revenue is neither directly related to the
formal territorial structure nor to the general
level of decentralisation of the country. While
there are federal countries like Brazil or Nigeria
that effectively share a high proportion of EI
revenues with regions, federal Mexico transfers
less than 20 per cent of EI revenue. Conversely,
some unitary countries such as Bolivia or Peru
redistribute up to 55 per cent of their EI revenue
to sub-national units. There is no clear
association between the allocation of EI revenues
and the share of fiscal decentralisation in each
country either. Figure 1 shows that sub-national
public expenditure as a share of total public
expenditure is not associated with the
decentralisation of EI revenues in six Latin
American countries. Even though Peru and
Ecuador have relatively low levels of fiscal
decentralisation, the Peruvian state is highly
decentralised when it comes to allocating EI
revenues. A similar comparison happens between
Brazil and Mexico, with Mexico favouring lower
decentralisation of EI revenues despite having
higher levels of fiscal decentralisation.
A second feature of vertical distribution is that
sub-national beneficiaries (regional, state and
local-level governments) vary widely as well. In
federal states like Brazil, Nigeria and even
Mexico, the bulk of allocated transfers go to
state-level governments, probably because the
central government spending is channelled
through the existing fiscal decentralisation
structure. In two of the three cases, we observe
that revenues transferred to regional or state-
level governments more than double the share of
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revenues allocated to local or municipal
governments (45 per cent to 21 per cent in Brazil
and 36 per cent to 18 per cent in Nigeria).
By contrast, in non-federal (or unitary) systems
like Peru and Indonesia where decentralisation is
a relatively new phenomena, local-level
governments receive more than three times the
share of EI revenues than state-level
counterparts (43 per cent for municipalities
compared to 12 per cent for regions in Peru, and
12 per cent compared to 3 per cent in Indonesia).
Bolivia initially had a more equitable
distribution across the three tiers of government
(37 per cent to the national government, 37 per
cent to the regional government and 26 per cent
to municipalities). After 2012, President Morales
increased fiscal transfers in favour of local
governments (in the form of cash transfer
schemes managed by the central government)
while reducing transfers to regions (prefecturas),
most of which were governed by opposition
parties. These changes confirm the political
nature of decentralising EI revenues: ‘[I]f
confronted with the opportunity of need to
decentralise, the national executive prefers to do
it toward the local level, since mayors pose less of
an electoral and financial threat than governors’
(Falleti 2010).
3.2 Horizontal distribution
Table 1 also shows significant variation in the
existing methods for distributing EI revenue to
producing districts only or favouring a more
equitable distribution across all territories
including non-producing areas (horizontal
distribution). Once again, the degree of
decentralisation of EI revenues is not related to
the type of beneficiaries. At high levels of
decentralisation, countries like Bolivia would
prioritise transfers to producing districts and
allow some distribution to non-producing
regions, whereas Nigeria would favour formula-
based participation to benefit all sub-national
governments and restrict the funds going to
producing states only (Kâ Diongue, Giraud and
Renouard 2011). In contrast, Brazil and Peru
have preferred formulas that devolve revenue
back to the producing region or state and
localities in producing regions. Yet the Brazilian
government has sought to compensate non-
producing regions by investing in essential
infrastructure (ports, roads, pipelines and
railways) to support extractive activities.
Furthermore, the Brazilian Congress adopted
new legislation in 2013 to redistribute oil
revenue among all federal states, and is
currently in the process of approving a law that
allows the use of oil-related revenue in education
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Figure 1 Relation between fiscal decentralisation and decentralisation of EI revenues 
Note *Average for years 2000–07.
Source Data taken from Ruiz Duran (2011). 
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sector expenditure. However, the three
producing states (and original beneficiaries of
the devolution mechanism) have stopped the
law’s implementation through an appeal to the
Constitutional Court (Fick 2013; Reuters 2013).
In countries with a medium level of
decentralisation of EI revenue, revenue tends to
be distributed through a combination of
devolution and formula-based mechanisms.
Colombia has moved in a similar direction as
Brazil – from a system that concentrated transfer
of royalties on the producing regions, to a more
equitable system where most of the royalties are
distributed between all sub-national jurisdictions.
In Indonesia, oil-related transfers go exclusively
to the producing areas (provinces and districts),
but 50 per cent of the value of these transfers is
discounted from the ordinary transfers that these
provinces and districts should receive from the
national government (Morgandi 2008). More
recently, a percentage of the EI revenue has been
given to jurisdictions adjacent to the producing
ones to compensate negative externalities linked
to extraction. However, these criteria frequently
generate grievances because negative
externalities do not coincide with the boundaries
of official jurisdictions. This opens the way for
continuous demands from populations who feel
excluded from fiscal distribution. Mexico is the
only country to distribute EI revenue
proportionally across the entire country through
an allocation formula.
In countries with low levels of EI decentralisation
(Ecuador, Ghana and Papua New Guinea), most
EI transfers tend to favour producing regions
only. In Ecuador, sub-national governments
(provinces and municipalities) have benefited
from fiscal decentralisation since the mid-1990s,
but this devolution did not include the specific
transfer of EI revenues. With the advent of the
commodities boom after 2004, the government
further centralised the allocation of EI revenues
while reducing the fiscal and political leverage of
the producing regions as well.
The review of the different criteria followed by
the countries in our sample provides some
preliminary evidence that needs to be further
tested. The data reported in Figure 1 confirms
that the general degree of fiscal decentralisation
of the country matters. Countries with higher
levels of decentralisation (Brazil and Mexico)
tend to prioritise a type of redistribution that
benefits all the regions across the country. At the
opposite extreme, countries with a weak
decentralisation (Peru and Ecuador) concentrate
the transfers on the producing jurisdictions.
Colombia and Bolivia, which have moderate
levels of fiscal decentralisation, combine
devolution to the producing regions with
formula-based distribution to all the territories.
The argument holds, in general terms, for the
four non-Latin American countries included in
our sample. The evidence also suggests that high
levels of fiscal decentralisation provide sub-
national governments across the country with
greater bargaining power to demand the
distribution of EI revenues more broadly.
4 Discussion and some implications for policy
reforms
This article has offered a brief overview of
existing mechanisms for distributing EI revenues
and the empirical variation of mechanisms
across cases and territories. The review
illustrates how little is known about the
institutions and political dynamics of
transferring EI revenues from central to sub-
national governments. There are several
questions that need to be addressed before
making recommendations to citizens, national
policymakers and international donors about the
‘optimal’ distribution mechanisms. In this
section, we discuss these challenges, interpret
the available evidence and discuss alternative
approaches to understand how to maximise the
impact of EI revenues at the sub-national level.
4.1 Who benefits from EI revenues?
We find significant variation regarding the
beneficiaries of natural resource revenues,
particularly depending on whether these
revenues benefit producing regions and localities
alone or whether they are further distributed to
benefit non-producing jurisdictions as well.
a We do not find a consistent pattern to
distributing EI revenues to solely target
producing districts or more equitably across all
districts. The federal estates in the sample
(Nigeria, Brazil and Mexico) tend to favour a
more equitable distribution than non-federal
countries. Governments in unitary settings
have sought to re-centralise the management
of EI revenues in order to ensure a more equitable
distribution of EI revenues. In cases like Ecuador,
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Colombia and federal Brazil, the government
has invested considerable resources to develop
a national infrastructure, which benefits both
producing and non-producing regions.
However, we have suggested that greater
centralisation of EI revenues in non-federal
countries may allow the executive considerable
discretionality to benefit partisan allies or
undermine the opposition in producing and
non-producing regions.
b One possibility to be further explored is that
countries will favour more equitable
distribution of EI revenues when sub-national
governments also take part (directly or
indirectly) in the national governing coalition.
In principle, if local elites have strong
connections with central governments, they
may be more able to gain access to fiscal
resources, projects, discretionary transfers
and policy influence. This is the case of Bolivia
and Colombia. In Bolivia, President Evo
Morales would have preferred to re-centralise
revenues after the 2005 reforms but had to
compromise a fairer and more proportional
distribution of revenues with the opposition
governors and mayors (especially in three
hydrocarbon-rich regions).
c However, a stronger alignment between
central and sub-national governments may
also mean greater dependency on the
executive and less autonomy to pursue the
regions’ own development strategies.
4.2 Fiscal decentralisation and extractive revenues
Much of the debate around the allocation of EI
revenues fails to take into account the relative
weight of the extractives sector in the overall
fiscal decentralisation and budgetary
management. An initial comparison suggests
that there is no relation between the share of EI
revenues and the share of government revenues
(as percentage of GDP) transferred from central
to sub-national governments. In some countries
like Ecuador or Mexico, the share of fiscal
transfers tends to be greater than the share of EI
transfers, whereas in Bolivia, Peru, Brazil or
Colombia, it is the opposite, there is greater
decentralisation of EI revenues.
a One potential explanation is the timing of
reforms: if fiscal reforms precede the
distribution of EI revenues, the share of sub-
national government spending appears to be
higher than the share of EI transfers, other
things being equal. This is the case in
Ecuador, which adopted fiscal decentralisation
in 1997 long after the devolution of EI
revenues. Conversely, EI transfers are likely to
be higher in a context of fiscal decentralisation
if they were bargained during a commodities
boom as in the case of Brazil, Peru and
Bolivia. In cases like Peru and Bolivia,
redistribution reforms adopted after 2000
took place in the context of strengthening
democratisation and fiscal decentralisation
reforms, which reinforced the strength of local
actors to organise electorally, promote social
mobilisations and disrupt the workings of
extractive activities (Arellano Yanguas 2012;
Crabtree and Chaplin 2013).
b Governments may also be more reluctant to
share extractive revenues when these
represent a significant part of total
government spending. In practice, there are
multiple ways in which EI revenues could be
managed by the central government to fund
capital or current investments without
channelling through fiscal decentralisation
formulas. Ecuador, Colombia and to a lesser
extent Bolivia are cases where central
governments have recentralised the
distribution of EI revenues while gaining
greater political leverage over the
management of these allocations.
c It remains an empirical question as to the
extent to which greater recentralisation of EI
revenues in the hands of the executive may
offer greater opportunities for discretionary
use of EI revenues in the form of off-budgetary
expenditures, for example. As a direct policy
implication, it is relevant to reinvigorate
budget transparency debates for the
management of EI revenues, to ensure that
citizens, parliaments and independent audit
institutions are able to monitor and oversee
the transparent execution of these resources.
4.3 Federalism and extractive revenues
This article finds no evidence of a direct
relationship between the formal organisation of
the territory (into a federal or unitary
administration) and the magnitude of transfers
to sub-national governments. The common
expectation is that autonomous sub-national
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units in a federal state would have greater
leverage to extract and manage taxation and
non-tax revenues, compared to the more limited
autonomy (or greater dependency) of sub-
national governments on the central government
in a unitary state. The cases analysed suggest
that a federal structure alone does not guarantee greater
availability of EI revenues at the sub-national level. For
example, there are federal cases like Mexico,
which devolve a much lower percentage of EI
revenues to local and state governments than
unitary states like Bolivia and Peru.
a One potential explanation is that effective
transfers of EI revenues take place when local
governments increase their bargaining power
vis-à-vis the central government, either through
winning local elections, by organising social
mobilisation or by making coalitions with the
extractives sector. Some of these factors are
present in the cases of Peru and Bolivia. In
Colombia and Ecuador, governments were able
to re-centralise the management of EI
revenues given the weak and limited ability of
sub-national governments to oppose the
government or present an organised movement
during the decade of reforms (Rudas Lleras
and Espitia Zamora 2013).
b There also is considerable variation in the way
EI revenues are distributed to local
governments. Most but not all federal states
tend to privilege allocations to state or
regional governments (Brazil and Nigeria)
whereas unitary states tend to benefit local or
municipal governments. A potential
explanation is that central governments in
unitary states would prefer to target resources
to municipal governments in order to enhance
their political leverage over fragmented
governments (as in the case of Indonesia and
Peru), whereas in federal structures, central
governments are less able to re-centralise EI
revenues or influence the policy (and political)
preferences of sub-national governments.
c Based on the available evidence, we cannot
extract a direct association between the
territorial organisation and the allocation of
revenues, but we would make the case that
federal states would be better equipped to
manage the transfer of EI revenues to sub-
national governments in a more efficient and
accountable manner (Ahmad and Mottu 2003).
5 Conclusion
The growing importance of the extractive sector
in the developmental strategy of many poor and
middle-income countries raises the question of
the distribution of EI revenues among levels of
government and across different jurisdictions at
a given level. Theory provides clear guidance for
designing such redistributive policies. Regarding
vertical distribution, the theory says that each
level of government should benefit from EI
revenues in proportion to their functional
responsibilities and that sub-national
governments’ finances should not rely on volatile
revenue. Regarding horizontal distribution,
technical criteria highlight the importance of
compensating to the producing jurisdictions for
the negative externalities linked to extraction
without generating territorial unbalances or
grievances due to an extremely unequal
distribution of revenues. Our review of
redistributive policies in ten resource-rich
countries shows that institutional considerations
are not sufficient to determine actual revenue
sharing. The variety of criteria for the
distribution of EI revenues points to political
factors as the main drivers of those policies. In
this article we have attempted a first cut at
understanding what those political factors might
be. The data do not show clear patterns. Neither
the level of fiscal decentralisation nor the federal
or unitary nature of the state seem to determine
the proportion of EI revenues transferred to sub-
national governments. In contrast, the historical
context in which EI-related transfers are
negotiated and the relative strength of the sub-
national governments vis-à-vis the central
government are the factors that seem to
influence the level of EI-revenues transfers.
We find that the way in which the decentralised
revenues are distributed between producing and
non-producing territories also varies greatly in
our sample countries. Here the level of fiscal
decentralisation does seem to matter. Higher
levels of fiscal decentralisation in the country are
correlated with a more equal distribution across
all the regions of the country. This suggests that
differences in bargaining power of sub-national
governments due to previous fiscal
decentralisation might be the explanation.
Decentralisation empowers all sub-national
governments and decreases the asymmetry in
negotiating power between non-producing
regions and producing jurisdictions (that have
IDS Bulletin Volume 45  Number 5  September 2014 65
1 Joshi_Schultze-Kraft IDSB45.5.qxd  11/08/2014  16:50  Page 65
the capacity to disrupt the activity of the
extractive companies). Thus, the data presented
in this article suggest that distributional policies
are best explained by differences of bargaining
power between the central and the sub-national
governments and across sub-national
jurisdictions. This conclusion calls for better
understandings of the nature of such bargaining
power in specific contexts – a task that we have
started in a separate paper (Arellano Yanguas
and Mejía Acosta 2014). Despite well-developed
theoretical rationale for sharing of revenues
from extractive industries, how it is
operationalised seems to rest ultimately on
politics; thus the political relations between
national and sub-national governments seem
critical in shaping revenue policies. 
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Notes
1 This mechanism is also known as ‘derivation’
according to Ehtisham Ahmad and Eric Mottu
(2003) but we refer to ‘devolution’ in this
article.
2 These territories are usually identified with
those hosting infrastructure needed for the
exploitation or transportation of minerals. 
3 The data does not represent actual shares but
EI revenue entitlements according to existing
legislation, and tends to underestimate the
participation of central government. There
are other types of EI revenues such as margins
of profit from state-owned oil and mining
companies that are managed by the national
government and may be distributed to sub-
national governments in the form of
discretional transfers.
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